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The Close Corporation's Counterparts in
France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom: A Comparative Study
By MARK R. VON STERNBERG
JD., Vanderbilt University, 1973; Formerly Attorney, United States Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 1974-77 Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Arkansas Company, Inc., Newark, New Jersey.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent evolution of the closely-held corporation in the United
States has been accompanied by a parallel development in legislative
and judicial attitudes. In particular, there has emerged a gradual
awakening to the inadequacies of the "concession" theory of corpora-
tion law, which maintains that corporate owners are powerless to de-
part from "statutory norms" in organizing the corporation, and a
corresponding predisposition in favor of a contractual approach which
stresses that corporate structures should reflect the wishes of the com-
pany's shareholders. In short, a growing perception has developed that
the constraining principles of corporation law may be inappropriate for
a form of commercial organization that limits the number of its partici-
pants, and the search for a body of law to govern such an entity has
resulted in an increasing reliance on partnership principles.
Contractual norms and partnership principles have provided the
underlying theory of organization for a number of concerns in foreign
jurisdictions which may be considered counterparts, though not
equivalents, to the close corporation. In civil law countries, leading ex-
amples of such small business structures are the Gesellschaft mit
beschrdnkter Haftung (hereinafter GmbH) in Germany and the socit
responsabihtb limitbe (hereinafter SARL) in France.' In common law
jurisdictions, the British "private company" is analogous to the Ameri-
can closely-held concern.
As indicated, the SARL, the GmbH, and the private company are
1. The civil law counterpart to the close corporation is usually characterized as the
limited liability firm. See generally Eder, Limited Liability Firms Abroad, 13 U. PilT. L.
REv. 193 (1952).
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not equivalents to the close corporation. Properly understood, each of
these entities is really a hybrid which borrows from both partnership
and corporation law principles to form its collective features.' All of
the above mentioned entities, however, share the following
characteristics:
(a) the entity confers limited liability on its members;
(b) the term "limited" or its equivalent must appear after the firm's
name;
(c) the concern is endowed with juridical personality;
(d) the delecius or inluituspersonae characteristic of the partnership
is usually emphasized; and
(e) the firm is not dissolved by the death of a member unless ex-
pressly provided for in its founding documents.
As will be more fully developed later, the law in each case also pro-
vides for some form of centralized management and imposes varying
restrictions on the transferability of shares.3
The SARL, the GmbH, and the private company have evolved
pursuant to contractual norms and without the impediment of the
American "concession" theory. They have thus been shaped largely by
the commercial needs of the parties rather than by the constraint of
statute. The following analysis will compare the three types of corpo-
rate organization as they have developed and will also discuss the role
that public policy has played in limiting that development.
2. The difficulty of characterizing the close corporation's counterparts abroad is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that civil law jurisprudence does not share the common law's
sharp distinction between corporations and partnerships but rather tends to group its com-
mercial organizations into two principal families, Le., personal associations and capital as-
sociations. For an excellent discussion of the different kinds of personal and capital
associations, see generally Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law,
18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 546 (1953). See also Drury, Legal Structures of Small Business
in France and England Compared, 27 I1T'L & COMP. L.Q. 510, 515 (1978).
3. The characteristics of a partnership which are usually said to distinguish it from the
corporation are:
(a) creation and dissolution of the partnership is contractual and not dependent on
statute;
(b) delectus personae obtains;
(c) the partners have unlimited liability for all debts and other obligations of the part-
nership;
(d) partnership interests are generally not transferable without dramatically altering
the firm; and
(e) the partnership has no existence as a legal entity independent from its members.
See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 46-65 (2d ed. 1970).
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II. SOURCES OF THE LAW
The basic statute governing the GmbH in Germany is the Gesetz
betrefend die Gesellschaften mit beschrinkter Haftung4 (hereinafter the
GmbH Statute). This legislation has been praised as a triumph of com-
parative law in action.' As a leader in its field, the GmbH Statute
served notably in the modelling of the SARL in France after France's
reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine at the conclusion of World War 1.6
The original French statute governing the organization and opera-
tion of the SARL was the law of March 7, 1925. 7 In 1966, France
adopted a new law with respect to all socit.s commerciales including
the SARL. The law, hereinafter referred to as the Law of July 24, 1966,
became effective on February 1, 1967.8
The statute which regulates both public and private companies in
the United Kingdom is the Companies Act of 1948.' This act has been
modified considerably, especially with respect to private companies, by
the Companies Act of 1967,10 the Companies Act of 1976,11 and the
Companies Act of 1980.12
Ill. THEORY OF ORGANIZATION
A. Historical Framework
The theory underlying all modem civil corporation codes is that of
contract. This follows from the fact that civil law corporate forms are
in large measure descended from the Roman societas, itself an early
form of partnership. 3 For reasons equally dependent on historical cir-
cumstance, modem British company law is similarly dependent on the
theory of contract and on partnership principles. Indeed, it has been
broadly stated that the "modem English business corporation has
evolved from the unincorporated partnership, based on mutual agree-
ment, rather than from the corporation, based on a grant from the state,
4. [1982] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 1 477 (hereinafter cited as the GmbH statute).
5. Eder, supra note 1, at 193.
6. Kohler, The New Limited Liability Company Law of France, 24 Bus. LAW. 435
(1969).
7. (1925) Bulletin (new ser.) no. 17 at 176, Code de commerce 85.
8. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise J.O.
64022. This law has been supplemented by decree no. 67-236 of March 23, 1967.
9. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38.
10. 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 81.
11. 24 & 25 Eliz. 2, c. 69.
12. 28 & 29 Eliz. 2, c. 22.
13. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 752 (4th ed. 1980).
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and owes more to partnership principles than to rules based on corpo-
rate personality."' 4
B. The Theory in Practice: The "Dispositive Norms" Approach of
the GmbH Statute
The fact that the civil law theory of corporations is contract and
not "concession" explains the substantial latitude conferred upon the
parties in shaping their entity. The leading example of the theory in
practice is the GmbH, where the theory has advanced so far that the
parties may virtually organize their company de novo with only mini-
mal statutory guidance.
In this respect, the GmbH is perhaps the most successful form of
enterprise to confer maximum flexibility on its participants together
with limited liability. This success results largely from the freedom of
contract granted to the parties in framing their constitutive documents.
The legislative technique for affording participants this autonomy is the
use of "dispositive norms." The statute applies only where the mem-
bers fail to adopt alternative provisions in the charter. In other words,
the provisions of German law affecting limited liability companies are
permissive in nature; they do not set forth standards to which the lim-
ited liability company must conform. Thus the GmbH Statute acts
only as a guide and does not prohibit the parties from formulating solu-
tions which differ from its terms.15
C. The Theory in Practice: Partnership Principles Underlying
British Company Law
As indicated previously, the creation and organization of a British
14. Gower, Some Contrasts between British andAmerican Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L.
Rav. 1369, 1371 (1956). See also Gower, The English Private Company, 18 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 535 (1953) for the evolution of the private company.
Some history might be helpful here. The evolution of modem British company law
begins with the passage of the Bubble Act in 1719, 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (1719), itself adopted in
reaction to the South Sea Bubble scandal. The Bubble Act was aimed at curbing the growth
of unincorporated stock companies. Paradoxically, it produced precisely the opposite effect
by inhibiting the government from granting corporate charters and thus stimulated a rebirth
of joint stock company ventures. In 1844, Parliament passed the first of its great Companies
Acts, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (1845), which permitted such companies to incorporate by register-
ing their deeds of settlement with the Board of Trade. The 1844 Act had withheld limited
liability from concerns registering under it, however, and in 1855, Parliament passed the
Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (1855) which conferred limited liability on all
registrants.




business organization are still regarded as essentially contractual. Ac-
cordingly, like the German GmbH Statute and unlike the mandatory
provisions of United States law, the model corporate constitution pro-
posed in the Companies Act of 1948 governs only in the absence of
contractual provisions to the contrary. Thus British law relies heavily
on partnership principles, and, as expressly provided under the Act, the
constitution ultimately filed by the parties has the binding effect of a
contract.1
6
The model corporate articles proposed in the Companies Act is set
forth in table A of schedule 1 thereto. Consistent with the contractual
theory of the Act, parties wishing to incorporate pursuant to its provi-
sions are permitted the widest latitude in drafting their articles, pro-
vided the basic form of the model is preserved. In the absence of
articles to the contrary, table A applies in whole or in part.'
7
D. The Theory in Abatement: The New "Objet Social" Doctrine of
Modern French Company Law
Commentators are largely in agreement that the Law of July 24,
1966, has moved the SARL away from the partnership concepts re-
flected in the socikt, en commandite simple and closer to the public
company principles which are manifest in the organization and struc-
ture of the societ anonyme.' s With this move, there has been a break-
down of the theory that the SARL is based entirely on a voluntary
contract between the parties which can be changed at will. The grow-
ing tendency has been instead to regard the SARL as being organized
for a definite object, to which the interests of the company's partici-
pants are subordinate. Accordingly, the structure of the SARL must
conform to the agreed upon object and can be modified only if the
situation of the company requires it.' 9
Hence, the SARL as it exists today can no longer be viewed as an
16. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 20.
17. Id. § 8(2).
18. Consistent with the general civil law classification of commercial organizations dis-
cussed in note 2 supra, French law distinguishes between soci&tfs depersonnAs, in which the
personality of the members is emphasized, and soci&ts de capitaux, in which the importance
of money is stressed. Representative of the former class are the socit en nom collectif (the
general partnership) and the sociMtM en commandite simple (the limited partnership). Repre-
sentative of the latter class are the socitk en commandite simple (the limited partnership), the
socit en comanditepar actions (the partnership limited by shares), and the socikte anonyme
(the public company). In between those two classes, as a type sui generis, is the SARL. See
Treillard, supra note 2.
19. Drury, supra note 2, at 519, and sources cited therein.
No. 2]
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association governed completely by the contractual consent of its mem-
bers but must be seen as an organization which is becoming increas-
ingly dominated by the wishes of majority shareholders and the
legislature itself. The freedom of the participants in organizing the en-
tity has receded as a factor underlying formation of the enterprise, and
in its stead competing considerations of public policy have made an
impact.2°
IV. FORMALITIES OF INCORPORATION
A. Founding Documents
The founding articles of the SARL and the GmbH are called re-
spectively the statuts2' and the Gesellschaftsvertrag.2 These documents
represent in large measure a cross between the articles of incorporation
and by-laws of an American corporation. They are intended not only
to provide the public with the minimum information normally con-
tained in the charter of a United States company but also to reveal such
internal matters as the distribution of power within the firm itself.
Minimum disclosures in the statuts and in the Gesellschaftsvertrag
include:
(a) the company's name-which may include the name of one or
more of its members;
(b) the fact that the company is doing business in limited liability
form, Le., as a GmbH or SARL;
(c) the company's purpose-which may be stated as broadly as
possible;
(d) the company's legal seat;
(e) the number of shares held by each shareholder; and
(f) the firm's stated capital.23
In each case, the law provides that the corporate constitution shall be in
the form of a contract which must be signed by the parties.24 The
SARL comes into legal existence upon the statuts being filed with the
commercial register.25 The GmbH becomes a legal entity only after its
20. See, e.g., Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 49.
21. Id. arts. 2, 34, 38, 40.
22. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 2.
23. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, arts. 2, 34, 38, 40; GmbH Statute, supra
note 4, § 2.
24. All of the parties must sign the SARL's statuts. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O.
64022, art. 37. See also GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 2.
25. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 5. The following illustrates the vital
importance of the commercial register in civil law systems:
[A] corporation does not acquire juristic personality, and many of its corporate acts
[Vol. 5
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Gesellschaftsvertrag has been notarized and the company has been en-
tered in the commercial register by a local court.
26
In the United Kingdom, the memorandum and articles of associa-
tion are generally speaking the equivalents of the American corpora-
tion's articles of incorporation and by-laws respectively. The
memorandum of association of a private company must state:
(a) the company's name;
(b) its legal seat (called in the Act its "registered office");
(c) the company's purpose, which may be stated as broadly as
possible;
(d) the company's stated capital; and
(e) the denomination of the company's issued securities and any
contractual rights flowing therefrom.
27
The articles moreover should conform to table A of schedule 1 under
the Companies Act of 19483 It is customary for provisions to be in-
cluded therein regarding such matters as quorum requirements and the
minimum and maximum number of directors.29
The formalities in the United Kingdom surrounding the memo-
randum and articles of association are largely the same for public and
for private companies. Thus the memorandum and articles must be
signed by each of the proposed shareholders, and each shareholder
must subscribe to at least one share. Together with the memorandum
and articles, a statement of the corporation's capital must be filed with
a declaration of compliance prepared by a solicitor stating that the con-
ditions of the act have been met.30 All documents must be filed with
the Registrar who registers them if they are in order.31 The company
do not become effective, until registration in the Register of Commerce. Deregis-
tration of a corporation, on the other hand, may have the effect of immediate and
complete termination of its corporate existence .... The reliance of third parties
on entries in the Register is strongly protected ....
R. SCHLSINGER, supra note 13, at 757.
26. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, §§ 2, 7.
27. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 2. For the memorandum of associ-
ation to be filed in the case of a public company, see Companies Act of 1980,28 & 29 Eliz. 2,
c. 22, § 2, sched. 1.
28. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 2.
29. Id.
30. Id. §§ 1, 2, 3, 9, 13, 15(2), 107, 200(4)-(5).
31. The Registrar of Companies supervises among other things the formation of all
corporations in the United Kingdom. If he is satisfied that the application for registration is
in order, he will issue a certificate of incorporation which is "conclusive evidence" that all
the requirements of registration have been complied with and that the company is a com-
pany authorized to do business under the Companies Act of 1948. See, e.g., Companies Act
of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 3.
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obtains legal personality as of the date of incorporation contained in
the certificate.32
Apart from these formalities, section 28 of the Companies Act of
1948 formerly contained additional provisions to be placed in the arti-
cles of private companies. That section defined a private company as
being a company which by its articles:
(a) restricted the right to transfer its shares;
(b) limited the number of its members to fifty, not including:
(i) persons who were currently employed by the company;
and
(ii) persons formerly employed by the company who had been
members at the time of such employment and who re-
mained members; and
(c) prohibited any invitation to the public to subscribe for any
shares or debentures of the company.
These conditions to private company status have been changed by
section 1(1) of the Companies Act of 1980 which defines a private com-
pany as being a company which does not meet the statutory definition
of a "public" company.33 Nonetheless, section 15 of the Companies
Act of 1980 makes it an offense for a private company to offer its shares
or debentures to the public.
B. Minimum and Maximum Numbers of Members
The minimum number of members who can participate in both an
SARL and a private company is two.3 The shareholders need not be
natural persons in either type of organization. 5 If an SARL does busi-
ness having less than two members, any interested party may demand
32. Id. § 13(2).
33. The Companies Act of 1980, 28 & 29 Eliz. 2, c. 22, defines a public company as
being one that is limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital which:
(a) states in its memorandum of association that it is to be a public company; and
(b) has complied with all provisions of the Companies Act of 1980 regarding registra-
tion and re-registration.
The public company must also have a nominal allotted share capital of not less than £50,000
(§§ 4, 85). The Act which thus reclassified public and private companies in the United
Kingdom requires public companies formed prior to adoption of the Act to register under
the new legislation either as a public company or as a private company (§ 4). A private
company may re-register as a public company (§ 5).
34. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, § 34; Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 38, art. 34.
35. Prior to 1967, a private company would not be entitled to certain specified "exemp-
tions" under the Companies Act of 1948 unless it could show that its owners were individu-
als. These "exemptions," however, were eliminated in the Companies Act of 1967.
[Vol. 5
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that company be dissolved unless the situation is corrected within one
year. 6 If a private company does business having less than two mem-
bers for more than six months, the remaining member becomes person-
ally liable for all the debts of the corporation.
3 7
The maximum number of members of an SARL is fifty.38 If the
members of an SARL exceed fifty in number the firm must transform
itself into a socibto anonyme, the SARL's public corporation counter-
part.3 9 Similarly, prior to the adoption of the Companies Act of 1980,
the maximum number of members who could participate in a private
company was fifty.40 Although this requirement has been dropped, 4' a
private company is prohibited from offering its securities to the pub-
lic.42 There is neither a minimum nor a maximum number of members
set for the GmbH, nor must the members be natural persons.43 How-
ever, a GmbH may not take advantage of the public capital markets.'
C. Capital Subscription Requirements
Civil law jurisdictions generally share a greater sensitivity to the
integrity of stated capital than do common law countries. In particular,
many provisions in civilian corporation codes can only-be understood
in terms of making a realistic disclosure of capitalization in the com-
pany's corporate constitution and of preserving stated capital as a gen-
uine cushion for the benefit of creditors.45
Minimum capital for the SARL is 20,000 francs. 46 All capital
must not only be fully subscribed, but fully paid in.47 Contributions in
kind are permissible, but these must be valued by an expert appraiser
who is either unanimously agreed upon by the members, or appointed
by a court. Moreover, all the members are jointly and severally liable
to third parties for five years following incorporation for the value fixed
36. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 9.
37. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 31.
38. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 36.
39. Id.
40. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28.
41. Companies Act of 1980, 28 & 29 Eliz. 1, c. 22, § 1.
42. Id. § 15.
43. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 1; De Vries & Juenger, supra note 15, at 871; see,
e.g., Judgment of Jan. 23, 1920, 98 Reichsgericht [RGZ] 66 (W. Ger.).
44. See generally Steefel, Doing Business in Germany: The GmbH, 33 TAXES 759 (1955).
See also Schneider, The American Close Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14 Bus.
LAW. 228 (1958).
45. See Eder, Company Law in Latin America, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW 5 (1951).
46. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 35 (1).
47. Id. art. 38.
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to the contribution in kind.4" The statute specifically prohibits con-
tributions en industrie, te., those based on services to the SARL.49 In
addition, if the SARL's capital falls below one-fourth of its original
value, a three-quarters vote of the capital may resolve to liquidate the
company at a special meeting of shareholders. In the absence of such a
vote, the capital must be reduced by the amount of the loss.5 0
Minimum capital for the GmbH is currently DM 50,000.
51 All
capital in a GmbH must be subscribed, but only one quarter of it need
be paid in.52 Contributions in kind are permissible but require the ob-
servation of certain formalities. 3 Among other things, the founders of
the GmbH must state their reasons for concluding that the exchange
between the corporation and the individual involved is equitable. Fur-
thermore, they must give assurances concerning the value of the contri-
butions as determined in their report. 54 A court or notary will deny
registration if the contributions are overvalued.5 In addition, founders
who misrepresent any material facts concerning the GmbH's organiza-
tion will be jointly and severally liable to the company for missing con-
tributions and other damages. 6 If the stated capital of a new GmbH
consists of paid-in capital as well as contributions in kind, the value of
the contributions in kind must amount to at least DM 25,000.11
There are no particular capital subscription requirements for the
private company. Nonetheless, section 1 of the Companies Act of 1948
provides that the liability of members is limited to the amount unpaid
on the shares, ie., the difference between the paid-in capital on the
shares and their nominal value as fixed in the memorandum of
association.58
48. Id. art. 40.
49. Id. art. 38.
50. Id. arts. 60, 68. The special meeting referred to above must be called by the com-
pany's auditor or its manager if three-fourths of the SARL's capital is used up. If the
SARL's manager or auditor fails to call the meeting, any interested party may petition the
Court of Commerce to liquidate the company. Id.
51. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 5.
52. Id. § 7.
53. Id. § 8.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 9(c).
56. Id. § 9(a).
57. Id. § 7.
58. L.C.B. GOWER, J. CRONIN, A. EAssON, & LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON,




V. "SHARES" AND "SHARE" TRANSFER
RESTRICTIONS
A. The Nature of the Participating Interests
Under no circumstances can the interests in the two civil forms of
organization under discussion-the SARL and the GmbH-be re-
garded as the equivalent of "shares of stock," as that term is under-
stood in the United Kingdom and the United States. This is because
neither the quota issued by the GmbH nor thepart sociale issued by the
SARL is a negotiable security. Rather, the GmbH quota is evidenced
by a notarial protocol at the time the company is formed, and the
SARLpart sociale is represented by a description in the SARL's statuts.
Neither interest can be in bearer or negotiable form. 9
The restrictive nature of the participating interests in the GmbH
and the SARL helps to inhibit the free transferability of these interests.
The quota can be transferred only by means of a notarial record to-
gether with an executory contract to transfer.60 Transfer of the part
sociale is effective only if evidenced either by a signed contract served
upon the company or by a notarial record of the company's consent.6 1
The SARL'sparts sociales must be of equal value. 2 Subject to the
limitation that none of its shares can be in negotiable form, an SARL
can have ordinary shares, shares preferred as to dividends or distribu-
tion on dissolution, and reimbursable shares. 3
Similarly, the quota does not constitute a uniform interest in the
GmbH. For instance, a GmbH can have non-voting quotas and quotas
with multiple voting rights. Furthermore, it may have quotas with
preferences with respect to dissolution or upon liquidation. Indeed, it
has been remarked that the "possibility of having classes of quotas, to-
gether with that of issuing bonds and hybrid securities would permit
the formation of a GmbH with a capital structure similar to that of a
59. See GmbH Statute, supra note 4, §§ 5, 15(a); Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O.
64022, arts. 42, 43. See also Kohler, supra note 6, at 437; Winkhaus & Stratmann, GmbH:
The Close Corporation in Germanp-Management and Capitalization Problemsfor U.S. Con-
trolled Subsidiaries, 28 Bus. LAW. 1275, 1280 (1973).
60. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 15.
61. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, arts. 20, 48.
62. Id. art. 35(1).
63. Becker, The Socit&Anonyme and the Socibtb a Responsabilitk Limitbe in France, 38
N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 835, 886 (1963). Reimbursable shares are the actions dejouissance; even
though their stated value is paid off in dividends, owners of these shares are entitled to a
vote and a share of the profits, although not a return of capital on liquidation.
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public issue corporation." Hence, diversity of participation is defi-
nitely possible.
No-par shares are not recognized by British law,65 but apart from
this restriction a private company can issue negotiable securities in any
variety. In particular, the memorandum of association may divide
shares into classes and determine the rights that flow therefrom. 6
Class rights may not be altered without a three-fourth's vote of the af-
fected class.67 Cumulative voting is outlawed, but voting agreements
among the members of a private company are permitted and are very
common.
68
B. Restrictions on the Transfer of Participating Interests
Of the three types of organizations under discussion, only the
SARL has mandatory restrictions imposed on it with respect to trans-
fers by the assocks of the company'sparts sociales. Set out in section
45 of the Laws of July 24, 1966,69 however, these mandatory restric-
tions affect only transfers to third parties. Such transfers must be ap-
proved at a shareholders' meeting by a double majority of the associbs,
ie., by a majority in number of the members coupled with three-
fourths of the capital. If the shareholders do not make a decision
within three months after notification by the associb wishing to make
the transfer, they will be deemed to have consented. In addition, if
consent is withheld and the member wishing to transfer has held his
shares for at least two years, he can demand that the remaining associs
purchase his shares. Within three months of this demand, the share-
holders must decide:
(a) whether they are going to purchase the tendered shares under
article 1868(5) of the Civil Code-which provides for a valua-
tion of these interests by an expert appraiser; and
(b) also whether the company is to reduce its capital by a repur-
chase of the shares.
If the shareholders do not act within the stated time, the member wish-
ing to alienate his shares can transfer them to a third party of his
64. De Vries & Juenger, supra note 15, at 877. See also Speer, Is a German Limited
Liability Company a Corporation, 10 INT'L LAW. 343 (1976).
65. See, e.g., Companies Act of 1980, 28 & 29 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 2(4)(a). See also L.C.B.
GOWER, supra note 58, at 238.
66. See, e.g., Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 72, sched. 1, table A, § 4.
67. Id. §§ 10, 72, 141.
68. Id. § 135.




Article 47 of the Law of July 24, 1966, provides that the transfer of
shares between members is unrestricted unless the sta/uts provide
otherwise. If the statuts do impose restraints, the transfer limitations
must be at least as liberal as the provisions of article 45 relating to third
party transfers.
Article 44 provides that shares may be freely transferred to
spouses, descendants, or ascendants unless some relevant restriction is
imposed by the statuts. The statuts may also make similar provisions
affecting the dissolution of community property between husband and
wife and with regard to the inheritability of shares in the event of a
member's death. As in the case of transfers between shareholders,
however, failure of the remaining associ~s to give their consent will
invoke the procedural machinery of article 45.
The GmbH Statute makes restraints on alienation of quotas en-
tirely a matter for the Gesellschaftsvertrag. Among other things, the
Act provides in section 15(5) that the transfer of a quota interest "may
be made dependent upon additional conditions, including the consent
of the company." Failure to give consent, moreover, may not be re-
viewed by the courts.71 The common methods of restricting transfers of
quotas include:
(a) requiring the unanimous consent in the Gesellschaftsvertrag of
all quota holders before any quotas can be transferred;
(b) providing for a right of first refusal in favor of the company or
the remaining quota holders;
(c) requiring the consent of management to any transfer; or
(d) providing in the charter that no quotas shall be alienated unless
the consent of the majority of remaining quota holders is
obtained. 2
Similarly, on the inheritability of quotas, the Gesellschaftsvertrag
may provide that specified persons are to become members upon the
death of a quota holder.73 Significantly, the charter may also provide
that when a member dies, his shares will be cancelled or the GmbH
dissolved.74
70. Id.
71. Judgment of June 20, 1916, 88 RGZ 319, 325. See also DeVries & Juenger, supra
note 15, at 873, n.34.
72. DeVries & Juenger, supra note 15, at 873.
73. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 15. It is doubtful that the inheritability of quotas can
be excluded. But see Judgment of Oct. 8, 1912, 80 RGZ 175, 179.
74. DeYries & Juenger, supra note 15, at 873.
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As indicated, prior to 1980, section 28 of the Companies Act of
1948 made it a condition to recognition as a private company that the
articles of association restrict the right to transfer the shares. Also, as
noted, under section 15 of the Companies Act of 1980, it is an offense
for a private company to offer its shares or debentures to the public.
Thus the transfer of shares in a private company is generally re-
stricted.75 Useful techniques commonly employed to effect this end
include:
(a) permitting unrestricted transfer in the articles (subject to the
maximum number of members not being exceeded) to named
individuals, to existing members, or to classes of relatives or de-
pendents of existing members;
(b) requiring the member wishing to transfer his shares to give no-
tice of his intention to do so upon the board of directors, where-
upon the board is constituted the shareholder's agent to offer
the shares to existing shareholders and providing that the shares
so tendered can be transferred to third parties only if existing
members do not take them up; and
(c) providing that all new shares shall, before issue, be offered for
subscription to existing members.76
VI. MANAGEMENT
A. The One-Tier Structure of Management
The GmbH, the SARL, and the private company are all managed
or governed by a one-tier management structure. The SARL is run by
its gerant;77 the GmbH, by its Geschftsehrer;78 and the private com-
pany by its general director.79
A great deal of the flexibility established by statute in these three
forms of business entities is derived in large measure from their simpli-
fied management structures. A single-tier management structure is ad-
ventagous in that it:
(a) facilitates corporate decision-making;
(b) renders those responsible for that decision-making directly ac-
countable to the shareholders without the interposition of a
middle tier of directors; and thus
75. [Doing Business in Europe] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 23,716.
76. McFadyean, The American Close Corporation and its British Equivalent, 14 Bus.
LAW. 215, 218 (1958).
77. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 49.
78. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 6.
79. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 176, 455(1).
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(c) promotes shareholder review of corporate action.
B. Management's Powers
1. The SARL
The SARL is managed by one or more gkrants who must be natu-
ral persons. The gkrants are named in the statuts or at a special meet-
ing of shareholders. They are not required to be members of the
entity."0 The powers of the grant are normally articulated in the com-
pany's statuts. If the statuts are silent in this respect, the gkrant's au-
thority is construed to embrace all acts which are necessary "to bind the
company within the limits of its corporate purpose.""1 Any provision,
moreover, in the statuts which attempts to limit the managerial power
of the grant or make its exercise dependent on the prior consent of the
associes is ineffective vis-it-vis third parties.82
If there is more than one manager, any one of them can bind the
SARL. A very limited exception to this exists where a grant's action is
opposed by another manager and the third party involved has knowl-
edge of such opposition. 3
2. The GmbH
The GmbH is always managed by one or several managers (Ge-
schtsfiahrer) who are generally named in the charter and who must be
natural persons.8 4 The corporate constitution may provide for a super-
visory board (4ufsich/srat) to supervise the management of the
company.
8 5
The GmbH statute makes no provision with regard to the function
of management in its conduct of the corporation's affairs. The scope of
management's function and its accompanying powers, therefore, is en-
tirely a matter of private contract to be worked out in the provisions of
the Gesellschaftsver/rag or through individual employment contracts.
Accordingly, it is left completely to the quota holders whether to be
80. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 49.
81. Id. art. 14.
82. Id. art. 49(b). A g&ant remains liable nonetheless for violations of the statuts. Id.
art. 52.
83. Id. art. 49(7).
84. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 6. Every GmbH must have at least one Geschiifts-
fikhrer. Id. § 5. In addition the GmbH is represented by its Geschaftsfahrer vis-a-vis third
parties. Id. § 35.
85. Id. § 52. If the company has 500 workers or more, such a board must be estab-
lished, and one-third of its members must be labor representatives.
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active in the business or to delegate corporate governance to the
managers.
Any transaction in proper form which is entered into by the Ge-
schdftsi2hrer acting for the GmbH is binding on the company. This is
true even if the action involved is in express disregard of restrictions
contained in the Gesellschaftsvertrag.86 The very limited exception to
this rule exists where collusion can be established between the third
party and the manager.8 7
3. The Private Company
In the United Kingdom, every private company must have at least
one director who need not be a shareholder and who is appointed by a
majority of shareholders.88 As a general rule, the articles will empower
the directors to appoint one or more managing directors who actually
govern the corporation while the regular directors merely participate at
board meetings.8 9
The powers of the directors and of the managing directors are con-
fined by the purpose clause set forth in the company's articles. Acts
that go beyond the purpose clause are ultra vires and unenforceable
against the company.90
This result has been somewhat modified by section 9(1) of the Eu-
ropean Communities Act of 1977. 11 It provides that a third party act-
ing in good faith can bind the company to a transaction outside the
scope of the objects clause if the transaction was decided upon by direc-
tors. Difficulties in interpretation have plagued application of this sec-
tion, particularly with regard to when a transaction was decided upon
by the directors and what constitutes good faith.92
86. Id. §§ 35, 36. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine does not apply in Germany, as it does
not in most civil law jurisdictions.
87. See Winkhaus & Stratmann, supra note 59, at 1282.
88. Companies Act of 1948, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 176.
89. Id. sched. 1, table A, arts. 76, 84(3), 107.
90. In re Jon Beaufort, [1953] 1 ch. 131. In that case, a company had changed from
being the manufacturer of ladies' garments to being a producer of wood veneer without
altering its purpose clause. On liquidation it was held that creditors could not recover be-
cause the debts were ultra vires.
91. The object of this legislation was to implement the first directive of the council of
the European Economic Community regarding the harmonization of member states' na-
tional company standards.
92. See Farras and Fowles, The Effect of Section 9 of the European Communities Act
1972 on English Company Law, 36 MOD. L. REV. 270 (1973).
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C. Corporate Governance by the Shareholders
Neither the Law of July 24, 1966, nor the Companies Act of 1948
have specific provisions empowering the shareholders to participate in
the management of the concern.93 However, section 45 of the GmbH
Statute provides:
The rights of the quota holders and their exercise with respect to the
affairs of the company, in particular its management, shall be deter-
mined by the charter in the absence of statutory provisions to the
contrary. Absent specific provisions in the articles of incorporation,
the provisions of sections 46 to 51 shall apply.
Consistent with the "dispositive norms" 94 approach of the GmbH
Statute, this provision permits but does not require quota holders to
assume a managerial role in conducting the company's affairs. Pursu-
ant to this section all quota holder action such as the holding of annual
meetings may be dispensed with. In addition, the rights, powers, and
duties of management may be reserved in the Geselschaftsvertrag-
either to specified quota holders or to the quota holders generally. The
charter may create privileges, such as use of the facilities or a role in
management, of which the quota holder may not be deprived.
9 5
The Gesellschaftsvertrag may also impose on its members duties
which are binding. Accordingly, a quota holder may be constrained:
(a) to act as manager to the GmbH;
(b) the sell exclusively to the GmbH;
(c) to transfer his quota to the GmbH upon ceasing to be a member
of another association;
(d) to make loans to the GmbH; or
(e) to guarantee its debts.96
These requirements manifest the partnership principle that the moti-
vating forces behind contracting with an individual member are hisper-
sonal resources, financial assistance, or contribution of talent.
93. Nonetheless, article 413 of the Law of July 24, 1966 makes any party liable as a
gkrant who directly or indirectly manages the affairs of an SARL. Law of July 24, 1966,
[1966] J.O. 64022, art. 431.
94. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
95. See GmbH Statute, supra note 4, §§ 46-51; De Vries & Juenger, supra note 15, at
874. See also Judgment of Jan. 23, 1920, 98 RGZ 66.
96. The general enabling provision for such requirements in the Gesellschaftsvertrag is
§ 3 of the GmbH Statute, supra note 4. See also De Vries & Juenger, supra note 15, at 876.
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VII. MEMBERS' CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT
A. Personal Liability of the Manager
Even though the GeschiftsfDhrer may bind the GmbH while acting
in disregard of an express provision in the Gesellschaftsvertrag, such
conduct on his part may give rise to an action by the quota holders
against the manager based on a breach of his employment agreement.97
Managers, moreover, are bound to observe the "care of a diligent busi-
nessman" with respect to administration of the company's affairs, and
failure to meet that standard may render them jointly and severally
liable.98
Similarly, directors of a private company have substantial duties
of honesty and good faith which are fiduciary in nature, and they may
become liable to the company if those duties are breached.99 In this
connection, directors are liable to the company for their breach of duty
in engaging in an ultra vires transaction. The company has the remedy
of restitution, while the directors retain the usual fights of contribution
inter se. 00
The SARL's girant, though he can bind the company in contra-
vention of a provision in the statuts, remains personally liable for any
violation of the statuts or for any other violations (fautes) committed
during his managemeht. 10  Any associ& may bring an action for per-
sonal damage incurred thereby, or he may bring an action alone or in
conjunction with other shareholders on behalf of the SARL against the
offending gbrant. 12 Any prohibition in the statuts against such an ac-
tion is void, and ratification of the manager'sfautes does not discharge
the manager.'
0 3
B. Removal of the Manager
A simple majority of the associbs ° of an SARL may remove the
grant with or without cause. Any provision which makes removal of
the manager dependent on a larger majority is null and void. °5 If dis-
missal has been without cause, the gbrant may bring an action for dam-
97. See GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 37.
98. Id. § 43(1).
99. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378.
100. L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 58, at 174, 180.
101. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 52.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ie., assoc~s representing more than one-half the capital.
105. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 55.
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ages. In such an instance, the court has complete discretion on the
amount of damages it can award, but it lacks jurisdiction to revoke the
gran's dismissal.106
Similarly, section 38 of the GmbH Statute expressly provides that
"the appointment of a Geschitsftshrer may be revoked at any time."
The charter may delimit this right to cases where important reasons
require the manager's dismissal. Nonetheless, the right to terminate a
Geschaftsfiihrer for an important reason is considered a rule of public
policy. 0 7 Therefore, neither a charter provision purporting to guaran-
tee a quota holder the right to be a GeschaftVsfhrer for life nor a re-
quirement in the Gesellschaftsvertrag that dismissal would require a
unanimous vote of the quota holders can bar dismissal of the manager
if "important reasons" are found to exist.10
Under section 184 of the Companies Act of 1948, a general meet-
hag of shareholders of a private company may dismiss any director by
means of an ordinary resolution requiring only a simple majority
vote.'0 9 Such dismissal would be without prejudice to the company's
obligation to pay the director compensation for breach of his service
contract."10
C. Regulations Pertaining to Conflicts of Interest Involving
Management
With respect to the SARL, the GmbH, and the private company,
the relevant law contains special provisions relating to possible conflicts
of interest involving management.
In the case of the SARL, article 50 of the Law of July 24, 1966,
requires notification to and approval by the shareholders concerning
every agreement between the company and one of its managers or
shareholders-either directly or through a nominee--or with another
company in which one of the managers or shareholders of the company
is a partner, manager, director, general manager, or member of the di-
rectorate or supervisory council.
106. Id. art. 55(1).
107. See Judgment of June 7, 1929, 124 RGZ 372. See also De Vries & Juenger, supra
note 15, at 881.
108. Judgment of June 7, 1929, 124 RGZ 372.
109. L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 58, at 149. In the case of the private company, a simple
majority means a majority in the number of members.
110. Companies Act of 1980, 28 & 29 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 47. In this respect, approval by
resolution of the general shareholders' meeting is required for any agreement whereby a
director will be employed by the company for longer than five years or which can be termi-
nated only under specific circumstances. Id.
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Under German law, self-dealing between a Geschdftsfahrer and
the GmbH is generally prohibited."' Nonetheless, a Geschftsfihrer
may achieve his aim by appointing a nominee or subagent. In addi-
tion, the Gesellschaftsvertrag may affirmatively permit self-dealing. In
the absence of such an express waiver in the corporate charter, the self-
dealing transaction will be deemed invalid.
1 12
In the United Kingdom, a director who owns shares or bonds in a
private company must disclose in writing that ownership to the com-
pany. 113 In addition, a great deal of case law has surrounded the doc-
trine of "taking corporate opportunity." Generally speaking, a director
must make full disclosure of any interest which he may have in any
contract or other arrangement made by the company. Depending on
the language in the articles, the director may or may not thereafter be
entitled to vote. The most common situation, however, is that in the
absence of an express prohibition in the articles, directors will be enti-
tled to vote, provided full disclosure is made.' 14
III. RIGHTS OF MINORITY IN CASE OF
MAJORITY OPPRESSION
A. Voting Requirements
One of the most important protections for minority shareholders
in Europe, as in the United States, is the large vote requirement where
significant corporate changes are contemplated. For example under
section 53(3) of the GmbH Statute, all organic changes such as charter
amendments, capital increases and decreases, and changes in corporate
form require a majority of three-fourths of the votes cast, a notarial
protocol, and filing with the commercial register. The same section
also provides that in such a case the consent of the quota holder whose
rights would be affected must be obtained.
With respect to the SARL, organic changes can be effected only by
a double majority vote, i e., by a simple majority in number of the asso-
111. Btargerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] art. 181 (W. Ger.).
112. Winkhaus & Stratmann, supra note 59, at 1282.
113. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 27.
114. See McFadyean, supra note 76, at 226. The Companies Act of 1980, 28 & 29 Eliz. 2,
c. 22, has imposed substantial new regulations in the conflict of interest area. In particular, a
director must in managing the enterprise consider the interests of the employees as well as of
the members (§ 46). Similarly, a resolution at the general meeting of shareholders is re-
quired prior to any agreement whereby a director is to acquire from or sell to a company
non-cash assets in excess of E1,000. Failure to comply with this provision renders the trans-
action voidable (§ 48).
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cibs coupled with three-fourths of the capital. 15
Fundamental changes in a private company, such as an amend-
ment to the articles, can only be accomplished at an extraordinary
meeting of shareholders, by special resolution requiring a three-fourths
majority of those voting."16 In addition, the articles may divide the
private company's shares into classes, and in that instance class rights
may not be altered without an 85 percent vote of the affected class.'
17
B. Forms of Relief and Redress
In addition to his right to sue for personal damages," 8 a disap-
pointed shareholder in the SARL may choose one of two avenues of
redress. He may seek judicial dismissal of an oppressive grant on the
grounds of cause /bgitime."9 In this respect, an associM may bring such
an action even though the majority has determined not to remove the
grant involved. Secondly, a disappointed shareholder may propose a
third party transfer of his shares under article 45 of the Law of July 24,
1966. In such a case, article 45 provides that if consent to the transfer is
withheld, the remaining associ&s must within three months purchase
back the shares or cause the company to buy back the stock by reduc-
ing its capital.
A dissatisfied member of a private company also has a twofold
remedy.' 20 Section 222(f) of the Companies Act of 1948 allows a mem-
ber to apply to the court to have the affairs of the company wound up
on "just and equitable" grounds. Such grounds would include situa-
tions where there is a deadlock between participants or where the ma-
jority is attempting to freeze out the minority in contravention of an
115. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 60.
116. L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 58, at 17.
117. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 §§ 10, 72.
118. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
119. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 55. It should be noted that cause kgi-
time differs significantly from juste motif, the standard which applies when the gbrant is
removed by a simple majority of the capital of an SARL.
120. Untreated here is the shareholder's right to bring a personal action for specific mis-
feasance used against him at common law. Similarly this portion of the Article will not
discuss the "derivative" action available to the minority shareholder if he can show that the
company will not lend its name to the proceedings. Formidable procedural barriers have
caused commentators to raise serious doubts as to how meaningful these remedies actually
are. See Drury, supra note 2, at 537.
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express or implied agreement not to do SO. 12 1 Secondly, an oppressed
member may also make application to the court under section 210 of
the Companies Act of 1948. That section empowers the court to:
make such order as it thinksfit, whether for regulating the conduct of
the company's affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of
any members of the company by other members of the company or
by the company ... or otherwise. (Emphasis supplied.)
The section specifically states that it is appropriate where a winding up
would prejudice the petitioning members and stipulates that the relief
granted under it may include "any alteration in or addition to any com-
pany's memorandum or articles . . . ." To date, section 210 has re-
ceived only reluctant judicial implementation.
122
By contrast, the rights of minority quota holders in the GmbH are
not impressive. In substance, a dissatisfied minority quota holder who
owns at least ten percent of the stock may convene a quota holders'
meeting to ask for a resolution on any matter or petition for a court-
appointed liquidator. 123 Moreover, any quota holder has the right to
ask for dissolution and liquidation of the company by court order. 124
The most important rights of minority quota holders in the
GmbH, however, derive from the judicial doctrine that all quota hold-
ers be treated equally. 125 A quota holder's right to equal treatment is
violated where the GmbH awards other quota holders contractual ben-
efits anticipating a distribution of profits. Under these circumstances, a
prejudiced quota holder may enforce his demand for compensation
from the company if such compensation would be fair and equitable
under all the circumstances.
26
121. Other "just and equitable" grounds include:
(a) that the "substratum of the company has gone";
(b) that "it is impossible to carry on the business at a profit";
(c) that "there is a deadlock in the management of the affairs of the company";
(d) that "there is fraud in the inception of the company"; and
(e) that "there has been misconduct by the directors."
See also Harris, Separate Treatmentfor Close Corporations.- Lessonsfrom England andAus-
tralia, 17 AM. J. CoMp. L. 194, 208-09 (1969).
122. Id. at 208-09.
123. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 66.
124. Id. § 61.
125. Judgment of May 15, 1972, Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] (W. Ger.),




IX. FINANCIAL BOOKKEEPING AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
SARLs, with corporate capital to be determined by decree, 127 are
required to have at least one auditor (commissaire aux comptes).128 The
auditor must be independent of the company, and he must maintain
that independence for five years after he has ceased to be auditor for
the SARL. 29 The auditor certifies the accuracy of the SARL's income
statement, the profit and loss statement, and the balance sheet. 130 The
auditor also verifies all financial information having a bearing on the
financial statements and is responsible for assuring equal treatment to
shareholders. 13 ' The financial reports must be submitted for approval
to the associbs within six months of the close of the fiscal year. 132 There
is no requirement that these reports be publicly filed.
The GmbH's annual financial statements, by contrast, must be au-
dited if the GmbH meets two of the following conditions for at least
two consecutive business years:
(a) it has gross assets in excess of DM 125 million;
(b) it has sales of over DM 250 million for the preceding year;
and
(c) it has an average labor force exceeding 5,000 for the pre-
ceding year.
133
If the GmbH meets any two of the above criteria, its financial state-
ments may be subject to publication in the commercial register. 34 In
addition and irrespective of its size, the company may be required to
make public disclosure of its financial statements under the Stock Cor-
poration Act of 1965 if the GmbH is controlled by a holding company
which is incorporated as a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), or if
the GmbH is controlled by a holding company and one of the con-
trolled entities is an Aktiengesellschaft.
135
If auditors are appointed, they must be certified public account-
127. The present level is 300,000 francs.
128. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 64. Other SARLs may have an auditor,
provided one or more associs representing at least one-fifth of the capital determine that
one should be appointed. Id.
129. Id. art. 65.
130. Id. art. 228. If the company is not required to have an auditor, these statements are
prepared by the g~rant.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 56.
133. Law of Aug. 15, 1969, [1969] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 1 1189 (W. Ger.).
134. Id.
135. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI 1 1185.
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ants and independent of the company. In the absence of a requirement
that auditors be appointed, the company's financial statements must be
prepared by the managers. The financial statements are approved at
the annual meeting of quota holders.
136
In the British private company, management has the principal re-
sponsibility for preparing for the company a balance sheet and a profit
and loss statement (called an "accounts" in the United Kingdom).
These accounts are then reviewed by an auditor, who must be in-
dependent of the company and a member of one of the recognized or-
ganizations of accountants. The auditor in turn prepares a report
which reflects his findings and which is presented at the annual meeting
of shareholders. 1
37
The accounts of a private company must be publicly filed. -31 Prior
to the adoption of the Companies Act of 1967, private companies in the
United Kingdom were not required to have their accounts either inde-
pendently audited or publicly filed. 139 Section 2 of the 1967 Act, how-
ever, eliminated the so-called "exemptions" of private companies thus
subjecting them, among other things, to the same auditing and disclo-
sure requirements as public firms.
14 0
X. BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE SARL, THE GmbH,
AND THE PRIVATE COMPANY WITH THEIR
"PUBLIC" COMPANY COUNTERPARTS
A. Partnership and Corporation Law Principles
As indicated earlier, the SARL, the GmbH, and the private com-
pany are hybrid forms which borrow heavily from partnership princi-
ples as well as from corporation concepts. The "public" company
counterparts to these firms are respectively the soci/&, anonyme (SA),
theAktiengesellschaft (AG), and the public company. In order to better
understand the role that the SARL, GmbH, and private company play,
it is helpful to compare them to the "pure" corporate form in the juris-
dictions under analysis. Therefore, this section will briefly compare the
SARL, the GmbH, and the private company with the SA, the AG, and
the public company.
136. GmbH Statute, supra note 4, § 46.
137. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 147-49, 156-57; Companies Act of
1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 81, §§ 13, 14, 16.
138. Companies Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 81, § 2.
139. Exempt Private Companies, 103 SOLICITORS J. 379 (1959).
140. See generally Leigh, Companies Act of 1967, 31 MOD. L. REV. 183 (1968). See also
Sheldon & Wheen, The United Kingdom, 28 Bus. LAW. 1239 (1973).
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B. The GmbH and the AG
Two of the major differences between the GmbH and the AG are
that the AG must have at least five shareholders"' while the GmbH
need have only one and that the AG requires a minimum capital of
DM 100,000142 while the GmbH can be formed with a minimum of
DM 50,000. The capital of the AG is represented by shares which may
be in registered or bearer form. In the case of registered shares, the
charter may require the consent of the management, the shareholders,
or an attorney for their transfer, but no other restraints may be im-
posed. 43 By contrast, the capital of the GmbH is divided into quotas
which can be transferred only if certain notarial formalities are ob-
served. Furthermore, the parties in the Gesellschaftsvertrag may im-
pose whatever additional transfer restrictions they consider suitable.
The GmbH may not have its quotas traded on public markets.
As mentioned previously, the GmbH is governed by a single tier of
management, ie., the Geschaftsftihrer.'4 The AG, on the other hand,
is managed by a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)145 and a management
board (Vorstand). The AG must publish audited financial statements
annually, 146 while the GmbH under most circumstances need not do
SO.
C. The SARL and the SA
Formation of the SA requires a minimum capital of 500,000
francs;'47 the SARL needs only 100,000 francs as minimum capital.
Furthermore, an SA must have at least seven shareholders (action-
naires),141 while an SARL need have only two associes.
14 9
Shares of an SA consist of negotiable securities which may be in
registered or bearer form. 150 Transfers of shares to third parties may be
restricted by requiring the company's prior approval in the statuts. In
141. Law of Jan. 30, 1937, [1937] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] 1 107, § 2 (W. Ger.); id. at
166, § 18(a).
142. Id. at 166, § 8.
143. Id. §§ 8-10.
144. See text accompanying notes 78, 84-86 supra.
145. Law of Jan. 30, 1937, [1937] RGB1 166, §§ 84, 95. GmbHs with more than 500
employees may also be required to maintain an Aufsichtsrat. GmbH Statute, supra note 4,
§ 6.
146. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] RGBI 1 1185-95.
147. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 71.
148. Id. art. 73.
149. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
150. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, art. 263.
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this case, the shares must be in registered form.15 1 By comparison,
shares in the SARL cannot be in the form of negotiable instruments;' 52
transfer requires service on the company of the signed agreement to
transfer or a notarial record of the company's consent thereto. In addi-
tion, article 45 of the Law of July 24, 1966, applies to all third party
transfers. Transfers among shareholders may be subject to restrictions
in the statuts, provided these are not more confining than those set
forth in article 45. 153
The SARL is governed by a one-tier management structure con-
sisting of grants. 5 4 By contrast, the SA is managed either by a board
of directors (conseil d'administration) together with a president (prsi-
dent),155 or by a supervisory board (conseil de surveillance) and a col-
lective directorate (directoire).'
56
All SAs must have at least one statutory auditor (commissaire aux
comptes) who certifies the SA's financial statements. 57 Furthermore,
the SA's financial statements must be published. By contrast, the
SARL is required to have an auditor only under specified circum-
stances, and its annual statements are never subject to public
inspection.'
58
D. The Private Company and the Public Company
Differences between the public company and the private company
have been minimized by section 2 of the Companies Act of 1967 which,
as indicated previously, eliminated the "exemptions" of private compa-
nies.' 59 This legislation effectively jettisoned two of the most coveted
privileges of private company status: the exemption from the require-
ment of filing audited financial statements, and the ability to make
loans to directors. However, some differences remain between the two
types of organizations.
151. Id. art. 274.
152. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
155. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, arts. 89-116.
156. Id. arts. 119-39. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that where an SARL
has more than 500 employees, a personnel committee (comm&tM d'entreprise) must be elected
from among its employees. Essentially, this committee advises the SARL's management on
working conditions. See, e.g., Ordinance no. 45-280 of Feb. 2, 1945; Decree no. 45-2751 of
Nov. 2, 1945; Law no. 49-1053 of Aug. 2, 1949; Decree no. 59-99 of Jan. 7, 1959; Law no. 66-
427 of June 18, 1966; Law no. 72-1225 of Dec. 29, 1972; Decree no. 73-223 of March 1, 1973.
157. Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 64022, arts. 218, 228.
158. See text accompanying notes 127-32 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
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Private companies have no minimum share capital requirements
whereas a public company must have an allotted share capital of not
less than £ 50,000, at least twenty-five percent of which, plus all of any
premium, must be paid up.160 Private companies can be formed more
quickly and expeditiously than public companies because, unlike pub-
lic companies, they need not file a prospectus or statement in lieu of
prospectus upon formation.1
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Again, unlike the public company, the private company can com-
mence business immediately upon registration with the registrar of cor-
porations16 2 and need not wait for a "Trading Certificate," which is
granted to public companies only after the registrar is satisfied that the
various statutory requirements have been complied with.' 6 Further-
more, the private company does not have to make a detailed report
(called a "Statutory Report") to members of a flotation of stock nor
convene a general meeting (called the "Statutory Meeting") shortly. af-
ter the date upon which it is entitled by the Trading Certificate to com-
mence business.'" Finally, a private company need have only one
director instead of a minimum of two.'
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XI. CONCLUSION
The SARL, the GmbH, and the private company are hybrid forms
which borrow substantially from both partnership and corporation law
principles. As such, they provide extremely elastic models of business
organization, conferring upon their members the desired elements of
limited liability and maximum flexibility. The legislative technique for
preserving these elements derives from a contractual theory of corpo-
rate formation in each jurisdiction involved. This technique reserves
significant latitude to the parties, both in shaping their entity and in
seeking individualized solutions to the problems of the small business
concern. In addition, the forms under discussion tend to give genuine
expression to the interdependent quality of the relationship among the
venture's participants.
Interdependence among the members is preserved by the share
160. Companies Act of 1980,28 & 29 Eliz. 2, c. 22, § 4. The public company's memoran-
dum of association must indicate its share capital and state that it is a public company. Id.
161. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 48.
162. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
163. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 109.
164. Id. § 129.
165. Id. § 176. For a general discussion of the advantages of private company status, see
Gower, The Englih Private Company, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 535 (1953).
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transfer restrictions described above and, in the case of the GmbH and
the SARL, by the issuance of non-negotiable interests. 166 In Germany
and France, moreover, ownership of the limited liability company's
shares is evidenced by entry of the member's name in the Gesellsehafts-
vertrag and the statuts, respectively. Thus, transfer of a quota or of a
part sociale is necessarily tantamount to amending the corporate char-
ter. Such restrictions do more than inhibit access to the enterprise by
third parties: they give vitality to the delectuspersonae principle by
creating the legal framework within which, absent unusual circum-
stances, the parties to the original undertaking can exercise meaningful
control over the composition of membership.
Flexibility is maintained in a number of ways, principal among
which is the statutory latitude extended the parties in drafting their cor-
porate documents. Such a legislative approach tends to make the par-
ties' agreement, rather than the statute, the operative and controlling
"law" in each individual case. In this respect, the GmbH's
Gesellschaftsvertrag and the SARL's statuts are more encompassing
corporate filings than the American corporation's charter, constituting
as they do a cross between the certificate of incorporation and the by-
laws.1 67 Moreover, the inclusive nature of the Gesellschaftsvertrag and
the statuts assures that adequate disclosure is made regarding such
matters as stock transfer restrictions and the actual authority reposed in
management. In a jurisprudence where corporate structures are highly
individualized--e.g., where the corporation is managed by its share-
holders-and "statutory norms" no longer prevail, such disclosure will
become increasingly important. Third parties dealing with the enter-
prise will no longer be able to rely on the "apparent authority" of a
corporate officer or director, but will be constrained to review the cor-
poration's charter to determine whether those with whom they are ef-
fecting business have the power to bind the company.
Another device which preserves flexibility in the SARL, the
GmbH, and the private company is the greatly simplified management
structure which these companies enjoy. Accordingly, the SARL may
be managed by one or more gtrants, the GmbH by one or more Ge-
schfti'Ahrer, and the private company by one or more directors.'
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There is not, in short, any provision for an intermediate group of direc-
tors who are responsible for formulating "policy." This simplified ar-
rangement essentially avoids the entanglements inherent in
166. See text accompanying notes 59-74 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
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compounded corporate structures in which there are two or more tiers
of management. Such structures exist in the United States with regard
to all corporations which are managed by a board of directors and by
corporate officers, and in France and Germany with regard to public
corporations which may be managed by a board of directors, a supervi-
sory council, and a directorate.169
Simplifying the management structure goes far toward making
management more directly responsible to the corporation's owners-a
primary aim in the closely-held corporation-and, at the same time,
eliminates tortuous problems concerning the delegation of powers and
shareholder review of corporate action. It should be noted in this re-
spect that the United States Model Business* Corporation Act has un-
dertaken some steps in this direction by providing, in part, that a
corporation may make provision in its articles for management of the
business by a person or persons other than the board of directors. 70
With respect to the underlying theory of organization, it must be
conceded that a contract theory, with its predisposition to flexible
norms and structural diversity, is vastly preferable to a theory which
demands vigorous conformity to "statutory norms". That is not to say
that liberty of contract is the only policy consideration reasonably
taken into account by the legislature in drafting corporate legislation.
Quite clearly, in France and in Germany (and to some extent now in
the United Kingdom), the shareholders have no right to veto proper
corporate action, or even corporate action undertaken in disregard of
an express prohibition in the charter."'7 Public policy resolves this con-
flict in favor of third party creditors who have relied in good faith on
the corporate form, rather than giving those who participate in the ven-
ture the benefit of their contract. To obtain this result, the jurisdictions
under analysis have estimated an appropriate balance between the
needs to be served by allowing corporate participants to organize their
entity freely and without interference by the State, and the necessity of
making that entity ultimately responsible to those with whom it trans-
acts business. This analysis, which takes into account competing con-
siderations of public policy, is largely impeded in a jurisdiction which
adopts "concession" as its theory of corporation law. In the latter, all
questions involving the exercise of corporate power are resolved solely
169. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
170. Model Business Corp. Act § 35 (1979). In addition, modem economic theorists
have concluded that many large corporations are run (de facto, not de jure) by a single tier
of managers. See J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 62-90 (3d ed. 1979).
171. See text accompanying notes 82, 86, 87, 90-92 supra.
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by determining whether that exercise was within the scope of the gov-
erning law.
Additional public policy limitations on the freedom of the parties
with respect to their charter are found in provisions governing the man-
ager's dismissal and in legislative protection of minority sharehold-
ers. 72 In the case of the shareholders' right to terminate an unsuitable
manager, even the very permissive German law intercedes to protect
the enterprise itself against managerial dictatorship. Here the public
interest requires that those forming the enterprise not be allowed to
contract away the company's rights by providing for a perpetual form
of governance which may ultimately prove unfavorable to the con-
cern's interests. Equity here is available, however, and the manager
may always proceed against the company if dismissal was unjustified or
otherwise in contravention of his employment agreement.
In the area of minority shareholder protection, the jurisdictions
under analysis have shown the most remarkable versatility. Remedies
range from the right to have one's shares repurchased (as in the case of
the SARL) to the right to seek dissolution (as in both German and
British law). The most significant departure from the "contract" theory
of corporate organization, however, is section 210 of the British Com-
panies Act of 1948, providing that an injured minority shareholder may
obtain such relief as the court deems appropriate. As shown, 173 the
section specifies that permissible relief includes amendment of the orig-
inal articles so as to make them conform to a just result. Although that
section has not received extensive judicial implementation, its very
existence seems to mark a pioneering direction in the field of minority
protection.
Finally, it is clear that financial auditing and disclosure require-
ments for the small concern in France, Germany and the United King-
dom are expanding. The imposition of such standards on companies
with restricted membership has been extensively debated, particularly
in the United Kingdom. In adopting section 2 of the Companies Act of
1967, however, Parliament was of the view that the needs for standardi-
zation of accounting together with adequate disclosure to creditors and
prospective stockholders outweighed the discomfort involved in open-
ing the affairs of the private family business to general public view.
The requirements described above are based on public policy con-
siderations which restrict the voluntary nature of the concern's organi-
172. See text accompanying notes 104-09 supra.
173. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
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zation. The dominant theory of the GmbH, the SARL, and the private
company is that of voluntary contract, not concession. In this respect
the time to abandon the view that limited liability is a concession of the
legislature has long since arrived. Not only does such a theory conflict
with commercial reality, but as shown, it serves as an actual hindrance
to commercial growth. No divine authority flows from the sovereign
state to the corporate form. Rather, as study of the limited liability
firm and the private company demonstrates, it can be sufficient if per-
sons hold themselves forth as limiting the risks of their ventures and
are accepted on that basis. In short, limited liability derives from a
contract among the participants in an enterprise which is recognized as
binding by the world at large and not only by a legislative act of grace.

